The Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914

London: The Bodley Head, 1986. First Edition [stated], presumed first printing. Hardcover. Very good/Very good. xii, 456, [2] pages. Frontispiece. Map. Note on Editorial Methods. Notes. Appendix 1 Biographical Notes. Appendix 2 Serving officers not previously mentioned, sending letters or telegrams of support to the Gough brothers. Appendix 3 The Irish Command in March 1914. Bibliography. Index. Some page discoloration noted. Published for the Army Records Society; Publications of the Army Records Society, Vol. 2. Ian Beckett is Professor of Military History at the University of Kent. Former positions include Professor of History at University College Northampton, Senior Lecturer at Sandhurst, Professor of Modern History at the University of Luton, and Major-General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Professor of Military Theory at the US Marine Corps University in Virginia. He is also Chairman of the Army Records Society. Other publications include 'The Oxford History of the British Army' and 'The Great War 1914-1918'. For the National Archives, he wrote the highly-regarded 'The First World War: The Essential Guide to Sources in the UK National Archives'. The Curragh incident of 20 March 1914, sometimes known as the Curragh mutiny, occurred in the Curragh, County Kildare, Ireland. The Curragh Camp was then the main base for the British Army in Ireland, which at the time still formed part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Ireland was scheduled to receive a measure of devolved government, which included Ulster, later in the year. The incident is important in 20th-century Irish history, and is notable for being one of the few occasions since the English Civil War in which elements of the British military openly intervened in politics. It is widely thought of as a mutiny, though no orders actually given were disobeyed. With Irish Home Rule due to become law in 1914, the British Cabinet contemplated some kind of military action against the unionist Ulster Volunteers who threatened to rebel against it. Many officers, especially those with Irish Protestant connections, of whom the most prominent was Hubert Gough, threatened to resign or accept dismissal rather than obey orders to conduct military operations against the unionists, and were privately encouraged from London by senior officers including Henry Wilson. Although the Cabinet issued a document claiming that the issue had been a misunderstanding, Secretary of State for War J. E. B. Seely and Chief of the General Staff (CIGS) Field Marshal Sir John French were forced to resign after amending it to promise that the British Army would not be used against the Ulster loyalists. The event contributed both to unionist confidence and to the growing Irish separatist movement, convincing Irish nationalists that they could not expect support from the British Army in Ireland. In turn, this renewed nationalist support for paramilitary forces. The Home Rule Bill was passed but postponed, and the growing fear of civil war in Ireland led to the British government considering some form of partition of Ireland instead, which eventually took place. The British army's principal base in Ireland was the Curragh Camp in County Kildare, not far from Dublin, where two cavalry units, the 5th and 16th Lancers, were stationed. On Paget's instructions the officers there were sounded out and Paget reported to the War Office in London that almost all of the 5th Lancers officers had said they would instantly resign if ordered to act against the Ulster Volunteers and he feared that the same thing would happen with the 16th Lancers. Brigadier-General Hubert Gough, the commander of the cavalry brigade, had indicated that he would do the same. The news created a sensation in the press, which reported ‘an Astounding Action' and ‘an Arrogant Claim to Disobey Orders' in ‘a Curragh conspiracy'. The authorities in London back-tracked at high speed. Asquith told the public that there had been ‘an honest misunderstanding' and that the government had never intended to take punitive action against the Ulster Volunteer Force. The War Office announced that there was no intention of using the army to enforce the Home Rule bill. The Curragh Incident is often called a mutiny or a proto-mutiny, as the dissenting officers had clearly stated that they would disobey orders, though they had not actually disobeyed any because no orders had been issued. The episode heartened the Ulster Unionists while reinforcing nationalist doubts of Westminster's appetite for Irish self-rule.