Brute Force; Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War

New York, N.Y.: Viking Penguin, 1990. First American Edition [stated]. First printing [stated]. Hardcover. Very good/Very good. xxii, 643, [3] pages. Includes 10 black and white maps (most of which are each a two page spread), and 63 tables. Also contains Statistical Appendix, Sources for Tables, Notes, Bibliography, and Index. Part one covers the Eastern Front, 1941-45; Part two covers The War From Afar: The Battle of the Atlantic and the Bomber Offensive 1939-45; Part Three covers The Mediterranean, 1940-45; Part Four covers "One Brick At A Time: North-West Europe from June 1944 - May 1945; Part Five covers One Hell of a Way to Run a War: The Pacific, December 1941 - August 1945. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War concludes that the Allied Forces won World War II not by the skill of their leaders, war planners and commanders in the field, but by brute force (which he describes as advantages in firepower and logistics). Ellis describes what he feels are poor decisions by the Allied High Command with regards to such things as employment of weapons systems or misuses of their overwhelming advantage in manpower. Among his criticisms are the use of armor in North Africa, the Soviet Union's use of manpower, wasteful bombing strategies (RAF Marshal Sir Arthur Harris' area bombing in particular), and the failure to target Japanese shipping lanes. He also points out the similarities between World War II generals like Bernard Law Montgomery and World War I generals like Douglas Haig (in particular, the cautious method both men used to plan battles). The book is noted for its extensive use of statistical background information. Skillfully analyzing a mass of previously inaccessible and often quite astonishing data, the author demonstrates conclusively that Allied Victory--against both the Axis and Japan--finally owed far more to the endless stream of tanks, artillery, and military aircraft rolling off Allied production lines than it did to the ability of their commanders. A major omission of almost all military histories of the Second World War has been the failure to emphasize the economic dimension of the conflict, and to establish beyond question the importance of the Allies' superior industrial capacity and reserves of raw material to the outcome of the war. In this provocative and ground-breaking study, John Ellis finally sets the record straight. Skillfully analyzing a mass of previously inaccessible and often quite astonishing data, he demonstrates conclusively that Allied victory-against both the Axis and Japan-finally owed for more to the endless stream of tanks, artillery and military aircraft rolling off Allied production lines than it did to the ability of their commanders. Drawing from his masterly analysis of production statistics, Ellis reviews the entire course of the war and demonstrates how American, British and Russian commanders continually mismanaged the resources at their disposal and how serious mistakes were made in almost every theater of war-land, sea and air. Time and again, Allied generals proved incapable of deploying their numerical advantage in the most effective way, instead falling back on crude, attritional tactics that prolonged the war unnecessarily: appalling armored tactics in Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe; Bomber Command's wrongheaded targeting policies; Russian acceptance of enormous casualty bills; the American navy's failure to recognize that Japan's economy and lines of imperial communication should have been the prime target-all of these issues and many more are thoroughly aired in this authoritative and stimulating work.