The Challenger Launch Decision; Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA

Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. Very good/Very good. David Henderson (Author photograph). xv, [1], 575, [1] pages. Figures. Tables. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. DJ has slight wear and soiling. Minor edge soiling. Ink notation on fep, NOT FROM AUTHOR. Diane Vaughan is an American sociologist and professor at Columbia University. She is known for her work on organizational and management issues, in particular in the case of the space shuttle Challenger crash. In the understanding of safety and risk, Vaughan is perhaps best known for coining the phrase "normalization of deviance", which she has used to explain the sociological causes of the Challenger and Columbia disasters. Vaughan defines this as a process where a clearly unsafe practice comes to be considered normal if it does not immediately cause a catastrophe: "a long incubation period [before a final disaster] with early warning signs that were either misinterpreted, ignored or missed completely." Vaughan received her Ph.D. in sociology from Ohio State University and is a laureate of the Public Understanding of Sociology Award, of the American Sociological Organization. The Challenger Launch Decision won the Rachel Carson Prize (inaugural winner) and the Robert K. Merton Award as well as being nominated for the Pulitzer Prize and National Book Award. When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect. No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster is a story not of evil but of the banality of organizational life. This powerful work explains why the Challenger tragedy must be reexamined and offers an unexpected warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age. Derived from a Publishers Weekly review: The loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986 is usually ascribed to NASA's decision to accept a safety risk to meet a launch schedule. Vaughan, a professor of sociology at Boston College, argues instead that the disaster's roots are to be found in the nature of institutional life. Organizations develop cultural beliefs that shape action and outcome, she notes. NASA's institutional history and group dynamics reflected a perception of competition for scarce resources, which fostered a structure that accepted risk-taking and corner-cutting as norms that shaped decision-making. Small, seemingly harmless modifications to technical and procedural standards collectively propelled the space agency toward disaster even though no specific rules were broken. While Vaughan's complex presentation will challenge some readers, her conclusion that the "normalization of deviance" builds error into all human systems is compelling.