The Final Treaty of Ghent, in the Form of the Outline and Detailed Analysis Sent to the Head of America's Diplomatic Corp in Europe: In the hand of negotiator Jonathan Russell, it includes a notice of its imminent signing

“We shall receive the British ministers at a conference this day to fill up the blanks, particularly those with respect to the limitation of capture at sea, and to arrange some of the formalities of the treaty.  This done, and fair copies of the treaty drawn up, it will be signed. You have now before you the results of our labors. I will make no other comment than that I believe we have done the best, or nearly the best, which was practicable in existing conditions.”

The 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution awarded the western frontier to the United States, but the British did not give up the idea of setting up a Native American buffer state between its holdings and the U.S. on that frontier. This hoped-for state would be shaped like a dagger and descend from the Canadian border on a line from the center point of Ohio west to the Mississippi River and reach to the far south of the Illinois Territory. It would act as a block to American immigration west, hinder U.S. use of the new Louisiana Purchase lands and the Mississippi River, discourage American trade in the west to the benefit of British merchants, set up an ally on the western border of the U.S., and make Canada safer from potential U.S. incursions.

By the late 1790s, from their forts in Ontario, the British were supplying and arming the Indians living in what is now the United States. By 1810 the Native Americans were ready to organize and were presenting a serious threat to American pioneers and interests. Two visionary Shawnee Indian leaders, Tecumseh and his brother The Prophet, realized that if US encroachment onto Indian land was ever to be stopped, this was the time. They rallied a broad Indian alliance to fight the white settlers. The alliance promised to sign over no more land to the whites, and the various tribes of the region promised to work together. The British were aiding and financing the Indian alliance from Canada. Though Tecumseh was defeated in Indiana by General William Henry Harrison in 1811, in 1812 threats of Indian uprisings remained a reality on the American frontier.

American trade was in a state of crisis by 1812. The British were seizing American ships on the high seas, and forcing seamen to join the Royal Navy or merchant navy.  This impressment of seamen was deemed necessary because of the difficulty in obtaining enough recruits in Britain. Probably in the neighborhood of 6,000 Americans were impressed by the British leading up to the War of 1812. Americans considered this action as a violation of their sovereignty, a real slap in the face. In addition, Britain seized vessels bound for Europe that did not first call at a British port. France retaliated, confiscating vessels if they had first stopped in Britain. Together they seized nearly 1,500 American vessels between 1803 and 1812. This was a staggering number, and as many of the cargoes were sold as prizes, the loss to American merchants was enormous.

Pushing for war in 1812 were the War Hawks, a group of prominent Congressmen mainly from the west and south, led by House Speaker Henry Clay, and also including John C. Calhoun. On June 1, 1812, President James Madison, sufficiently persuaded by the pro-war position, sent the U.S. Congress a war message, and war was declared June 17. But the U.S. was unprepared for the War of 1812, and the fortunes of war proved vacillating. There were successes, such as William Henry Harrison’s victory in the northwest in the Battle of the Thames, in which Tecumseh was killed, and Oliver H. Perry’s victory on Lake Erie. But there were also failures, such as Gen. James Wilkinson's expedition against Montreal; also, Fort Niagara was lost, Black Rock and Buffalo were burned, and great quantities of provisions and stores destroyed. The American hope of conquering Canada began to look like a dream, and the threat remained that the British and their Indian allies might yet gain a hold over territory in the American west in order to create an Indian buffer state between the U.S. and the Mississippi River. The British blockade of the U.S. eastern seaboard was constantly growing more rigid; not a single American man-of-war was on the open sea. Meanwhile the discontent with the war prevailing in New England, which was destined to culminate in the Hartford Convention, continued to be active and to threaten rebellious outbreaks. But the most ominous event was the downfall of Napoleon’s prospects, the likely conclusion of peace in Europe, and, in consequence, the liberation of the military, naval, and financial resources of Great Britain for a vigorous prosecution of the war in America. In 1813 the Americans agreed to mediation to end the war, but the British declined and instead in early 1814 offered direct peace talks to be held at Ghent in Belgium. The U.S. accepted that offer.

The head of the American negotiating team was John Quincy Adams, the U.S.’s most experienced diplomat. The four men who served with him were carefully selected by President Madison to reflect the varieties of political sentiment in the United States. Foremost among them was Henry Clay, the foremost War Hawk. Albert Gallatin had served as Secretary of the Treasury for both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. James Bayard was a U.S. Senator belonging to the Federalist Party who had been an opponent of the war, and was one of the 13 Senators to vote against declaring it. However, once the war began he supported the war effort. Jonathan Russell was acting U.S. ambassador to Britain when war was declared. In addition to being a negotiator, he was also serving as ambassador to Sweden and Norway. He proved instrumental in achieving the final peace terms. The talks commenced in August 1814.

William H. Crawford was sent as U.S. ambassador to France in 1813, with orders to demand the repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees (put in place by Napoleon to attempt to strangle the British Islands, but in doing so interfering with U.S. commerce), to protest violations of American trading interests, and to attempt to negotiate a commercial treaty. During the Ghent peace negotiations, he was responsible for superintending the American consuls in Europe and keeping them informed of developments. More than that, he was an advisor to the President on the happenings on the Continent. As Ambassador to the Court of one of the two major adversaries in the conflicts in Europe, he was also actively involved in the Ghent negotiation process in 1814, advising the negotiators and responding to their confidential communiqués. He would later serve as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Madison and Monroe.

The talks commenced August 8, 1814. At the start the U.S. negotiators had their instructions: the impressment of seamen and illegal blockades were the principal cause of the war,"" which would ""cease as soon as these rights are respected."" British cruisers must not be allowed to stop and search U.S. vessels, which practice ""withholds the respect due our flag…It is expected that all American seamen who have been impressed will be discharged.” Another major object of the negotiations was to end the British blockades. “We also need to be assured that no further interference with our commerce"" will take place. Next the instructions took up the question of the British arming and supplying the Indians. The article in the Treaty of 1794 ""allowing ""British traders from Canada and the North to trade with the Indian Tribes in the U.S., must not be renewed."" Nor must Britain continue to use native forces against ""our Western States and Territories.” Thus, the U.S. negotiators must insist on an end to impressment, and ship seizures, and a stop to aiding the Indians in the American west.

As for the British, they had made big promises to the Indians in return for their support, so they initially demanded that the country now occupied by the states of Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, the larger part of Indiana, and about one third of Ohio, should be set apart for them. This would also act as a buffer zone, a perpetual protection of the British possessions against American ambition. They also demanded that the United States should relinquish the right of keeping any armed vessels on the Great Lakes; and, in addition to all this, they asked for the cession of a piece of Maine, and for the right of navigating the Mississippi River. The Americans rejected these demands out of hand, and actively considered going home at the end of August. They ended up staying, and over the coming weeks and months there discussions, sending of notes and replies, references of disputed points by the British commissioners to their Foreign Office in London, and long waiting for answers.

Little progress was made in negotiations through October, and as November opened there was still no comprehensive draft treaty covering all the war’s issues. The Americans sought each party to make a draft, and then exchange drafts. But the British saw a competitive advantage in forcing the Americans to act first, and also claimed this was a matter of etiquette; they refused to prepare a draft. This the U.S. delegation considered petty and inappropriate, but the Americans decided to make the draft themselves. On November 10 the American draft for a comprehensive treaty was provided to the British. This was the first draft treaty of Ghent, and it contained 15 points. The British approved most of the articles in the draft, but disputes remained with regard to the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, the American right to fish in British waters off Canada, and the text relating to Indian lands. Since British support for the Indians was a main reason U.S. War Hawks wanted the conflict, the Americans were adamant on conceding nothing to the Indians. And now that peace was in the offing and the government in London (and the Duke of Wellington) wanted it sooner rather than later, the British were prepared to abandon their promises to the Indians of not agreeing to a treaty without taking their interests into account.

At last, after long discussions (in which the American envoys displayed great skill in argument), and after repeated references of the disputed points by the British commissioners to their Foreign Office, the British government declared that it was willing to accept American language relating to the Indians, and a treaty silent on both other subjects - the fisheries as well as the navigation of the Mississippi. This declaration reached the American commissioners December 22, 1814, and with it the last obstacle to a final agreement was removed.

The original report that the Treaty of Ghent would be signed imminently, with the final negotiating notes for the treaty provisions

Crawford was notified immediately. Autograph report signed, by negotiator Jonathan Russell, 8 long pages, Ghent, December 23, 1814, to Crawford. “In noticing the diversity of opinion which may occasionally occur in particular points between the members of the mission to which I belong, and which undoubtedly arises from the difference of the impression which the same circumstances make on different men, however sincerely united in the pursuit of the same ultimate object, I by no means set up for infallibility or am overconfident that the course of which I may be the advocate is the best. I am still further from intending to insinuate any reproach against the patriotism or integrity or intelligence of my colleagues because I happen to be so unfortunate as not to accord with them in my view of all the subjects, which, in the course of the negotiation are presented for discussion. My only object in communicating to you these things is to make you better acquainted with the character of our proceedings, to show you that both sides of a question have been examined, and the profit of your information and advice, if to be obtained in season to influence the final decision.  There are so many agents informing the opinions and producing the convictions of a man besides his reason... The influence of habit and of education is also unsafe and the wisest and best of men may in vain believe themselves free from the prejudices it necessarily engenders. A long cooperation with a party or a sect imbues the very soul with their colors and whatever purity we may affect or sincerely endeavor to attain we still give the same tinge to everything which we touch.  A professional education is likewise apt to impose fetters on the mind and to give a mechanical or artificial character even to our reasoning.  Aware of these and other frailties of human nature, if I am disposed perhaps to distrust too much the opinions of others I am taught a salutary diffidence in my own.  When however I encounter a man in whose heart all the nobler passions have found their home, who's head is unobscured by the fogs of false education, who's great object is the welfare of his country and pursues this object with an instinctive good sense that never deceives, I listen to him with unsuspecting confidence...”

“I will now endeavor to make you amends by stating the sober details of business, which I'm sure Will be more interesting to you. After my last letter to you of the second we heard nothing from the British ministers until the ninth when Mr. Baker their secretary called on us to ask a conference for the next day.  At this conference they informed us that their amendment to the first article could not be entirely withdrawn but they were willing so to modify it.... They gave us also to understand that all our propositions as a substitute for their additional clause to the eighth article were inadmissible on their part, however they presented one (marked A) which you will find enclosed....”

“We shall receive the British ministers at a conference this day to fill up the blanks, particularly those with respect to the limitation of capture at sea, and to arrange some of the formalities of the treaty.  This done, and fair copies of the treaty drawn up, it will be signed.  You have now before you the results of our labors. I will make no other comment than that I believe we have done the best, or nearly the best, which was practicable in existing conditions.”

The four large pages of intensive notations illustrate the fundamental basis of the peace: stop the war with few preconditions, and leave the other issues between the two nations to further negotiations in peacetime in the future. Here are a few excerpts:

The British wanted provisions with specificity, such as, “His Britannic Majesty agrees to enter into negotiations with the United States of America respecting the terms, conditions, and regulations under which the inhabitants of the United States take fish on certain parts of the coast of Newfoundland and other of his…dominions in North America…The United States of America agrees to enter into negotiations with His Britannic Majesty respecting the terms, conditions, and regulations under which the navigation of the river Mississippi…shall remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain”. The Americans felt these were unnecessary, and they were not included in the final treaty; moreover, they would “not accede” to introducing navigation of the Mississippi at all. “Yet to an agreement couched in general terms, so as to embrace all the subjects of difference not yet adjusted…the undersigned are ready to agree.”

The parties agreed “to the mutual restoration of territory taken by either party from the other during the war”, with the exception of a dispute in Maine (that would not be resolved for years), provided that “the claim of the United States shall not thereby in any manner be affected.” The Americans expressed concurrence with the British demand, and would “promote the abolition of the slave trade”.

The treaty was signed December 24, 1814. The fundamental basis of the peace: stop the war with few preconditions, and leave the other issues between the two nations to further negotiations in peacetime in the future. But in addition to the written provisions of the treaty, there were unwritten understandings of enormous significance. This made the Treaty of Ghent one of the most important ever signed by the United States. The United States gave up its designs on Canada, which left Britain free to cease looking over its shoulder at North America. It could concentrate its efforts elsewhere. In return, Britain stopped supporting the Indians in the “buffer state” in their fight against the encroaching Americans. Their withdrawal was the death knell to the Indian’s efforts; and they were the true losers in the war. The way to the American west was now open, the great impediment removed. The United States gained in another way - domestically - as the turning away from old enemies and issues led to the molding of a separate American future. The war’s end unified the country and led to the Era of Good Feeling. As Albert Gallatin said,“They are more Americans; they feel and act more as a nation”. It let loose a burst of energy in emigration, commerce and invention that changed the face of the country.

This report was acquired by us from a direct descendant of William H. Crawford, and it has never before been offered for sale.