Guadalcanal: The First Offensive; United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. Reprint Edition. Hardcover. Very good. xviii, 413 pages., maps (some fold-out), charts, footnotes, appendices, bibliographic note, index. This work contains 15 black and white maps in the text, 21 color maps in inverse order inside the back cover, and 78 black and white illustrations in the text. Topics covered include The Strategic Decision; Plans for Invasion; The Invasion; Consolidating the Beachhead; Increasing Air and Ground Action; The October Counteroffensive; Decision at Sea; Advances Toward Kokumbona; The Situation in December; The December Offensive; XIV Corps' First January Offensive; the West Front; XIV Corps' First January Offensive; The South Flank; Fighting on Guadalcanal; XIV Corps' Second January Offensive; Final Operations on Guadalcanal; Epilogue: Occupation of the Russells. Epilogue: Occupation of the Russells. Also contains Appendix A. Letter from General Harmon to Admiral Chormley, 6 October 1942; Appendix B. General Patch's Letter of Instructions to General Collins, 5 January 1943; Appendix C. XIV Corps Field Order No 1, 16 January 1943; Appendix D. A Japanese Analysis of American combat Methods on Guadalcanal; Appendix E. U.S. Army Battle Participation List for Guadalcanal; Guide to Footnotes; Bibliographical Note; and Index; Also includes three charts (on Organization of South Pacific Forces at the Inception of Task One; Organization of Forces for Task One; and Organization of Landing Force for Task One. John Miller, Jr. was a Scottish born naturalized U.S. citizen who earned his Ph.D. in History from the University of Iowa in 1942. In World War II he saw service overseas with the U.S. Marine Corps including service in the Solomon Islands where he participated in the Bougainville operations. He became a member of the historical staff of the Department of the Army in 1945. He wrote and co-wrote official history volumes, other historical monographs, and numerous articles. He also taught at the University and graduate level as several academic institutions. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive is a tactical history of ground operations involved in seizing and holding the heavily jungled island of Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands. It covers the campaign from the initial invasion on 7 August 1942 to 21 February 1943 when the area including the Russell Islands was finally secured. "The successes of the South Pacific Force," wrote Admiral Halsey in 1944, "were not the achievements of separate services or individuals but the result of whole-hearted subordination of self-interest by all in order that one successful 'fighting team' could be created."* The history of any South Pacific campaign must deal with this "fighting team," with all United States and Allied services. The victory on Guadalcanal can be understood only by an appreciation of the contribution of each service. No one service won the battle. The most decisive engagement of the campaign was the air and naval Battle of Guadalcanal in mid-November 1942, an engagement in which neither Army nor Marine Corps ground troops took any direct part. This volume attempts to show the contribution of all services to the first victory on the long road to Tokyo. It does not describe all ground, air, and naval operations in detail but it does attempt, by summary when necessary, to show the relationship between air, ground, and surface forces in modern warfare. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive rests upon somewhat different sources from most other volumes in the Pacific series of U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The War Department's historical program had not yet been established in August 1942 when the Solomon Islands were invaded by the Allies. No historians accompanied the Marine or Army divisions to Guadalcanal with the mission of preparing thorough and detailed histories of the campaign. The interviews of whole companies and critiques of actions that were conducted by Army and Marine historians in later campaigns were never conducted on Guadalcanal. Interviews with individual officers and men were conducted by theater and War Department historians long after the fighting was over, but by that time memory was none too fresh. As a result it has not been possible to analyze the actions of small units on Guadalcanal as completely as in other volumes in the Pacific series.