Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power

New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1976. First edition. First edition [stated]. May be second printing. Hardcover. Good in good dust jacket. Price clipped. Signed by author. DJ has some wear, soiling, and small edge tears. Signed inscription on fep.. x, [2], 234, [2] p. Explains Henry Kissinger's general philosophy of foreign policy and makes clear the connection between Kissinger the scholar and Kissinger the statesman. The main body of the book deals with Kissinger's major foreign policy initiatives. His role in the Indochina war is traced with fairness and accuracy. The openings to the Soviet Union and to China are explained and assessed from all angles. The "troubled partnership" with Europe is examined critically; the approaches to the Third World, Latin America, and the United Nations are evaluated; and finally, Kissinger's controversial diplomacy in the Middle East is subjected to careful scrutiny. From Wikipedia: John G. Stoessinger, Ph.D. (Harvard), a prize winning author of ten leading books on world politics, has been the recipient of the distinguished Bancroft Prize for History for The Might of Nations, and has served as Acting Director for the Political Affairs Division at the United Nations. On the eve of World War II, Dr. Stoessinger fled from Nazi-occupied Austria to Czechoslovakia. His family was saved by a Japanese diplomat, Chiune Sugihara, who issued three visas to transit Russia, allowing them to escape to Shanghai via Siberia and Kobe. Dr. Stoessinger is currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, lecturing extensively throughout the world, and serves as Distinguished Professor of Global Diplomacy at the University of San Diego and is a visiting lecturer at the University of California, San Diego. Stoessinger is notable for his individual analyses of war, contrasted with the systemic views more commonly studied by political scientists after the Second World War. An example of this is his work in Why Nations Go to War. In the first section of this novel, the Iron Dice, Stoessinger offers an alternative explanation of the causes of World War I, one that includes human reactions and feelings. In 1976, Stoessinger pleaded guilty to concealing fraud totaling at least $260, 000 committed by Anne Lament, who used letters of recommendation from him which she addressed to overseas banks and governments. He subsequently received a full Presidential Pardon from Ronald Reagan, thereby nullifying the original offense. Stoessinger was only a child when Adolf Hitler invaded his home of Austria in order to obtain Anschluss. As a Jewish family, they needed to escape from the Nazis. They received a visa to Shanghai, China from Chiune Sugihara, a Japanese diplomat who helped thousands of Jews escape from the Nazis. These were the beginnings that shaped Stoessinger's world view and interest in 'why nations go to war. ' Much like the scholar Thucydides in the days of the Peloponnesian Wars, Stoessinger believes that war is neither impersonal nor inevitable. One cannot blame merely events for the start of a war, as it eventually comes down to the decisions made by men and women. A strong defender of diplomacy, he asserts that many wars (including the most current Third Gulf War) could have been avoided or solved without the use of violence. One of the main theories that can be contributed to him is the idea of perceptions and misperceptions. He believes that on the eves of most major conflicts, the political leaders involved make critical judgments (often misplaced) which send their country into the conflict. These misperceptions occur on four main levels. The first is a misperception of themselves, their role in the world, and their loyalty to an outcome. According to Stoessinger, George W. Bush made the transition from pragmatist to crusader during his terms as President, developing misperceptions of himself in the process that have proven detrimental to finding peace in the Middle East. The second level is misperceptions of the adversary. Often this includes demonization and a lack of understanding and objectivity in a situation. The third level is misperception of the intentions of the adversary and the last level is misperception of ability of the adversary. Stoessinger.