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The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology Paperback - 2001 - 1st Edition

by Fodor, Jerry A

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MIT Press (MA), 2001. Paperback. Good. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.Dust jacket quality is not guaranteed.
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Details

  • Title The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology
  • Author Fodor, Jerry A
  • Binding Paperback
  • Edition number 1st
  • Edition 1
  • Condition Used - Good
  • Pages 144
  • Volumes 1
  • Language ENG
  • Publisher MIT Press (MA), Cambridge, MA
  • Publication date 2001
  • Bookseller's Inventory # G0262561468I3N00
  • ISBN 9780262561464 / 0262561468
  • Weight 0.36 lbs (0.16 kg)
  • Dimensions 8 x 5.72 x 0.32 in (20.32 x 14.53 x 0.81 cm)
  • Age range 18 to UP years
  • Grade levels 13 - UP
  • Category Psychology
  • Library of Congress subjects Philosophy of mind, Cognitive science
  • Library of Congress Catalogue Number 990089687
  • Dewey Decimal Code 153
  • Quantity available 1

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From the publisher

In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works).

Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started.

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