BIBLIO is the largest independent book marketplace in the world, with over 100 million books.

Skip to content

Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)

Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)

Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)
Stock photo: cover may vary

Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic) Paperback - 2025

by Eagle, Antony

Add to wish list
  • Used
  • Good
  • Paperback
Used - Good

Description

paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book.
Ask the seller a question Add to wish list
A$64.14
Free Delivery within USA
Standard delivery: 7 to 14 days
More delivery options
Dropship order
Ships from Bonita (California, United States)

Details

  • Title Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)
  • Author Eagle, Antony
  • Binding Paperback
  • Condition Used - Good
  • Pages 102
  • Volumes 1
  • Language ENG
  • Publisher Cambridge University Press
  • Publication date 2025-01-30
  • Bookseller's Inventory # 100921019X.G
  • ISBN 9781009210195 / 100921019X
  • Weight 0.32 lbs (0.15 kg)
  • Dimensions 9 x 6 x 0.21 in (22.86 x 15.24 x 0.53 cm)
  • Category Philosophy
  • Quantity available 1

About Bonita California, United States

Biblio member since 2020

Terms of Sale: 30 day return guarantee, with full refund including original shipping costs for up to 30 days after delivery if an item arrives misdescribed or damaged.

Browse books from Bonita

Reader reviews for Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)

From the publisher

Reasoning from inconclusive evidence, or 'induction', is central to science and any applications we make of it. For that reason alone it demands the attention of philosophers of science. This element explores the prospects of using probability theory to provide an inductive logic: a framework for representing evidential support. Constraints on the ideal evaluation of hypotheses suggest that the overall standing of a hypothesis is represented by its probability in light of the total evidence, and incremental support, or confirmation, indicated by the hypothesis having a higher probability conditional on some evidence than it does unconditionally. This proposal is shown to have the capacity to reconstruct many canons of the scientific method and inductive inference. Along the way, significant objections are discussed, such as the challenge of inductive scepticism, and the objection that the probabilistic approach makes evidential support arbitrary.
tracking-