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Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)

Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)

Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)
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Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic) Other -

by Antony Eagle

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Cambridge University Press CUP , . Other. New.
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Details

  • Title Probability and Inductive Logic (Elements in Philosophy and Logic)
  • Author Antony Eagle
  • Binding Other
  • Condition New
  • Pages 102
  • Volumes 1
  • Language ENG
  • Publisher Cambridge University Press CUP
  • Publication date
  • Bookseller's Inventory # 6403491258
  • ISBN 9781009210195 / 100921019X
  • Weight 0.32 lbs (0.15 kg)
  • Dimensions 9 x 6 x 0.21 in (22.86 x 15.24 x 0.53 cm)
  • Category Philosophy
  • Quantity available 4

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From the publisher

Reasoning from inconclusive evidence, or 'induction', is central to science and any applications we make of it. For that reason alone it demands the attention of philosophers of science. This element explores the prospects of using probability theory to provide an inductive logic: a framework for representing evidential support. Constraints on the ideal evaluation of hypotheses suggest that the overall standing of a hypothesis is represented by its probability in light of the total evidence, and incremental support, or confirmation, indicated by the hypothesis having a higher probability conditional on some evidence than it does unconditionally. This proposal is shown to have the capacity to reconstruct many canons of the scientific method and inductive inference. Along the way, significant objections are discussed, such as the challenge of inductive scepticism, and the objection that the probabilistic approach makes evidential support arbitrary.
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